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Abstract
This study uses a cost-function-based model of production processes in U.S.
agriculture to represent producers’ input and output decisions, and the implied costs of
reductions in risk associated with leaching and runoff from agricultural chemical use.
The model facilitates evaluation of the statistical significance of measured shadow values
for “bad” outputs, and their input- and output-specific components, with a focus on the
impacts on pesticide demand and its quality and quantity aspects.  We find that the
magnitudes of the shadow values vary substantively by region, are statistically
significant, and imply increased demand for effective pesticides over time, stemming
largely from improvements in quality due to embodied technology.2
Introduction
The benefits and costs of chemical
1 use in U.S. agriculture, in terms of the
augmentation of both effective production and environmental degradation, have long
been debated.  Clearly, such chemicals have both private and social value, in that they
allow farmers (producers) to expand output (and revenue) which, in turn, ensures a
greater supply of agricultural products for both U.S. consumers and export.  But there are
also private and social costs of chemical use – in particular the private (purchase) costs
incurred by producers, and the resulting environmental risks.
While the private cost of pesticide abatement obviously includes the per unit price
of the chemical inputs, the true economic cost of pesticides also reflects the research
developments embodied in the pesticide input (through its chemical composition), that
both augment its effective impact and reduce risk.  These associated research costs may
be primarily reflected in the purchase price (and thus borne by the user), but are also
supported through public R&D expenditures.  Social costs also accrue from the use of the
environment as a “free” input, as producers’ use of pesticides potentially imposes risks to
both human health and the broader ecological environment.
The benefit to producers of using the environment as a free input takes the form
of increased output for a given level of inputs (or lower input costs for a given production
level), than would be possible if producers were required to reduce environmental risk.
That is, lowering risk implies either decreased output (since production of desirable and
undesirable outputs is joint), or increased input use (by substitution for the chemical
inputs or by employing alternative waste disposal practices).  Thus, policy legislation
                                                
1 When referring to agricultural “chemicals” from this point forward we are referring to fertilizers and
pesticides, though much of the analysis focuses on the effects of pesticide use.3
requiring reduction of risks associated with pesticide use will impose costs on the
agricultural community, which in turn has implications for agricultural commodity prices.
In this study we explore these relationships using a detailed cost-function-based
model of the production structure of U.S. agriculture.  The analysis is performed using
state-by-year panel data (48 states for the period 1960-96) for multiple outputs as well as
inputs, and including measures of pesticide use and undesirable or “bad” outputs (human
risk associated with leaching and runoff).  The pesticide data are constructed by
calculating hedonic measures of effective (quality-constant) prices, based on application
rate, human risk scores, and half-life characteristics across a broad range of pesticide
types.  The bad output data represent the extent to which the concentration of a specific
pesticide exceeds a water quality threshold.  These data incorporate both direct
information on human risk according to LD50 measures, and data on climate, types of
soils, and application rates and timing.  Our data set thus allows a more detailed
evaluation of production patterns, and their link with pesticide use and environmental
damage, than has been possible in previous studies.
The costs associated with reducing risk are represented by shadow values for the
bad outputs, which embody underlying technological changes and their effects on output
and input composition.  These shadow values may be interpreted as the foregone
marginal benefits of being able to use the environment freely, or, conversely, as the
amount farmers would be willing to pay (on the margin) for the use of the environment.
The shadow values of bad outputs, or risk from agricultural chemical use and
resulting leaching and runoff, thus depend on both the technological substitution
possibilities, and the input demand and output supply behavior, underlying agricultural4
production processes.  Measuring these values, and determining their link to the demand
for pesticides and other components of the production structure, requires a detailed
estimable production model.  Such a model permits a comprehensive analysis of output
and input supply, demand, and composition changes associated with substitution among
netputs in agricultural production, all of which aid in assessing the costs and benefits of
chemical use.  Econometric implementation of the model allows statistical inference
about the costs, and their determinants, of reductions in bad outputs (risk), and effective
demand for inputs (including pesticides), associated with good output production.
The results generated by this comprehensive model and dataset indicate that the
shadow values of risk factors are statistically significant, and larger and increasing over
time for pesticide leaching as compared to runoff.  This implies that substantive (and
rising) costs would be imposed on the agricultural sector by requirements to reduce
environmental risk deriving from pesticides.  These costs are associated with increases in
“effective” pesticide use, for a given level of agricultural output, that stem primarily from
innovation-induced chemical composition changes that improve abatement power while
diminishing risk.  This embodied innovation represents increasing, but costly, pesticide
quality.  Changes in overall netput composition associated with decreases in risk,
including higher levels of other inputs (except land), and a potential shift toward animal
as compared to crop output, are also implied by the measures.  And the costs of risk
reduction are clearly differentiated both temporally and spatially.5
The Methodology
The Estimating Model
Measuring the costs and benefits of agricultural chemical use, and their link to
environmental damage, involves explicitly modeling the production structure and
recognizing the wide variety of output (revenue) and input (cost) patterns exhibited in the
data.  Our state-level data set includes information on the production of two “good”
outputs and two associated “bad” outputs (human risk from leaching and runoff), and the
use of six inputs (including pesticides and fertilizer).  The output and input data are based
on carefully constructed multilateral price and implicit quantity indexes, using detailed
state-specific data and taking into account quality changes, as documented in Ball et al.
[1999].  The bad output and pesticide data are constructed via comprehensive hedonic
representations, as elaborated in Kellogg et al., and Nehing and Grube, respectively.
 Our analysis is founded on a cost-function characterization of U.S. agricultural
production processes, which represents a broad array of interactions among the
underlying inputs and outputs, including chemical application and environmental
damage.  For empirical implementation, this cost function is augmented by price
determination equations to represent profit maximization over good outputs, and by
spatial and temporal fixed effects to accommodate differences across states and time
periods.
 2  The form of the pesticide data allows us to incorporate and analyze the
                                                
2 Preliminary investigation instead using a profit function framework resulted in materials
demand and crop and animal output supply equations that violated standard regularity conditions.
This could be due to presence of negative profits implied in the U.S. agricultural sector when
adjustments to land, capital and other inputs are made to recognize their effective values.  The
alternative pm = MCm equations used here (where MC is the marginal cost and pm the market
price of output Ym) take the form of pricing rather than output choice equations.  This may seem
more valid in an imperfectly competitive market framework where the price is set according to
marginal revenue, but empirical results indicated that the pm data correctly represent marginal6
deviation between pounds of pesticides and the quality-adjusted “effective” pesticides
used in production.  And recognizing the presence of bad outputs in the production
structure permits evaluation not only of shadow values for risk factors, but also of their
linkages with inputs and outputs – in particular, pesticide quantity and quality.
More specifically, our cost function takes the general form TC = TC(Y,B,w,D,t)
where Y is a vector of good outputs (crops, YC, and livestock or animal products, YA); B
is a vector of bad outputs (proxies for environmental risk from pesticide leaching and
runoff, BHL and BHR);
3 w is a vector of input prices (land, LD, labor, L, capital, K,
pesticides, P, fertilizers, F, and other materials, M); D is a vector of dummy variables
corresponding to fixed effects for each state, specific time periods, the corn states, and
the cotton states; and t is a time trend.
Perhaps the most difficult “netputs” to measure in this model are the risk factors
or bad outputs, B, which are fundamentally connected with pesticide use.  Concerns
about pesticide residues found in ground and surface water have stimulated pesticide
regulatory changes, and, in turn, the development of chemicals that are less harmful to
humans and the environment, or less likely to migrate and thus contaminate water
supplies.  Kellogg et al. have developed indicators to measure the existence, and temporal
and spatial patterns, of the potential risk to health and the environment due to pesticide
loss from farm fields.  These indicators are estimates of relative risk, reflecting pesticide
concentrations from leaching and runoff that exceed “safe” thresholds for chronic
exposure.  The estimates are based on pesticide application rates, and determinants of
                                                                                                                                                
revenues for agricultural producers.  And omitting these equations reduced the robustness of the
marginal cost estimates.  Thus they were retained for the final empirical specification.7
pesticide loss such as the leaching/runoff potential of soils, chemical properties of the
pesticides, annual rainfall, and changes in cropping patterns.
More specifically, Kellogg et al. use data on physical properties of pesticides such
as soil sorption propensity, vapor pressure and solubility, and the persistence of the
pesticide in the environment, which affect the tendency of chemicals to leach or runoff.
Pesticide loss from fields is then estimated using a process model (GLEAMS), which
incorporates the complex interactions among these soil and pesticide characteristics, and
the contribution of weather factors, into risk indicators that represent changes over time
(year) and space (state) in the potential for agricultural contamination of water resources.
4
We use these proxies for contamination as our risk or bad output variables, Bk.
Bad Output Implications: Shadow Values and Input/Output Composition Effects
B is included in the cost function on the realization that bad outputs are produced
jointly with Y, or, conversely, that the environment is used as an unpaid input by
producers disposing effluent.
5  Production of bads allows more effective good – or
marketed – outputs to be produced for a given input level, or, conversely, lower input
costs for a given amount of Y.  Thus, reducing risk is costly to producers in terms of net
output – output per unit of input – because it requires substitution toward non-chemical
inputs, or less risky, but more costly, alternative chemicals.
                                                                                                                                                
3 In preliminary estimation fish stock risk from leaching and runoff were also included as bad
outputs, but when both types of leaching and runoff were included the shadow values for fish risk
were invariably insignificant (and sometimes not the expected sign), so they were dropped.
4 Further details about this estimation process is available in Kellogg et. al.  Documentation is
also available at the website www.nhq.nrcs.usda.gov/land/index/publication.html.
5 The notion that a reduction of a bad output is similar to an increase in a good output, in the sense
of defining the technological frontier, also provides the basis for the distance function
specification of undesirable output impacts in Ball et al. [2000].8
The shadow values (SV) of the bad outputs, or the (input) cost benefits from
generating risk, may thus be measured as the vector of cost effects  BTC = SVB.  For
example, the marginal benefit of permitting leaching that may cause risk to human health
(BHL) is SVHL = ¶TC/¶BHL < 0, or more generally, SVBk = ¶TC/¶Bk.  From the reverse
perspective, SVBk represents the input costs that would be incurred on the margin if a
decrease in Bk were legislated.  So these shadow values reflect the marginal amount the
producer would be willing to pay for the right to increase Bk.  The sign and significance
of such measures is thus a primary issue to explore in our analysis of pesticide and
resulting bad output impacts on U.S. agricultural production.
 6
Indicators of the temporal and structural patterns of the shadow values may also
be constructed by computing elasticities of the SVBk measures with respect to the time-
shift factor, t, and the components of the D vectors (representing structural changes in P
and F, and geographic location): eSVk,t = ¶ln SVBk/¶t, and eSVk,Ds = ¶ln SVBk/¶Ds.
Constructing such measures allows us to evaluate time- and space-dependent differences
in the costs of risk reduction for agricultural producers.
In addition, the SVBk measures – unlike technological measures of marginal
products or primal-side shadow values of pesticides or bad outputs such as those in
Headley, or Ball et al. [2000]
7 – incorporate the behavioral motivations underlying cost-
                                                
6 SVBk should be interpreted in the context of a private value to producers, since it represents the
amount that their expenditure on other inputs would have to increase (for a given output level) if
the environment could not be freely used.
   In terms of social costs, SVBk therefore indicates the
amount a marginal risk reduction must be thought to benefit society overall to justify legislation
requiring such reductions.
7 The measurement of marginal products to represent the productivity of agricultural chemicals,
and thus the costs of reducing their use, has been the focus of a large literature, beginning with
studies such as Headley, and Campbell.  The more comprehensive dataset and model used in this
study allows, however, a much more detailed specification of the impacts of pesticides and
associated negative outputs than has previously been possible.9
efficient production choices as well as technical substitution possibilities.  Thus, the
overall cost-effects represented by the SVBk measures may be decomposed into their
input-specific demand effects.  In particular, the linkage between bad outputs and
chemical use may be explored in terms of the impact of risk reduction on pesticide and
fertilizer demand; this is another primary issue we wish to empirically explore.
That is, based on Shephard’s lemma, pesticide input demand is represented by P =
¶TC/¶wP (where wP is the market price of P).  Elasticities of this demand relationship
with respect to changes in in the risk factors Bk, eP,Bk = ¶ln P/¶ln Bk, thus reflect the
dependence of pesticide use on the ability to dispose of waste in the form of leaching or
runoff.  Such elasticity measures can similarly be constructed for any input to represent
the input-specific impacts of risk reduction.  That is, assessing changes in input demand
and thus composition depend on the evaluation and comparison of exj,Bk =         ¶ln xj /¶ln
Bk elasticities, where xj = ¶TC(·)/¶wj for j=F,LD,L,K,M,P.
Although the overall cost elasticity with respect to Bk, eTC,Bk = ¶ln TC/¶ln Bk =
SVBk·Bk/TC, is negative if risk reduction is costly, if P and Bk are joint or complementary
(as one might expect due to the direct relationship between P use and risk), eP,Bk would
instead be positive.  In this case, an input bias in absolute terms is implied; if overall
input costs increase to reduce Bk, but P declines, other inputs must increase even more
than would be implied by the total cost elasticity.  It may be, however, that improvements
in the quality of the chemical inputs cause increased use of effective (quality-adjusted) P
to be associated with decreases in Bk, in which case the associated eP,Bk would be
negative.  If it is smaller (in absolute value) than the cost elasticity, however, reductions10
in risk remain biased, but in relative terms.  Evaluation of these demand relationships and
associated biases thus can provide important insights for assessing Bk effects.
The impacts on marginal costs of the good outputs from restrictions on bad output
production may also be measured to facilitate a full analysis of the input- and output-
specific costs of risk reduction.  That is, the shadow or true economic value of an output,
Ym, is represented by its marginal cost: SVYm = MCm = ¶TC/¶Ym.   The elasticities
eMCm ,Bk =  ¶  ln M  Cm /¶  ln Bk thus   pr  ovide indicator  s of pr  oducer  s’   motivations   to adapt
output levels   and composition in or  der   to r  educe r  isk.
Pesticide Demand: The Quantity and Quality of Pesticide Inputs
The various cost and demand relationships developed above are characterized
through 1
st and 2
nd order derivatives or elasticities of the cost function with respect to the
arguments of TC(·).  However, divergence of input demand patterns from those
appropriately represented by Shephard’s lemma often complicates or precludes the
estimation and interpretation of such measures.  For example, fixities, market power, or
changes in quality/composition, may cause the true economic value or quantity of an
input to deviate from its market value.  One way to deal with such a problem is to directly
adapt the price and quantity data to embody the discrepancy, by computing true effective
(or shadow or virtual) prices to be used as arguments of the cost function.
8
 Such an issue prevails in our current application
9, as violations of standard
regularity conditions, and thus problems with estimated marginal product or input
                                                
8 See Fulginiti and Perrin for a detailed discussion of the conceptual basis and use of the virtual
price framework.
9 Although not the focus here, sensitivity checks were also performed for the potential deviation
of measured and shadow values for the K, L and LD variables, which could rise due to quasi-
fixity.  Our assumption that the careful measurement of these variables maintained their
consistency with Shephard’s lemma was empirically supported.11
demand functions, have often been found for pesticides.
10  These violations have been
attributed to mis-measurement of the true pesticide input as a physical quantity (say,
pounds) rather than in terms of pest abatement.  Whereas measurement of abatement
power – increases in effective output from pest reduction, that depends on the chemical
composition of the pesticides – should be the goal if this is actually the “input” that is
being demanded.
Thus, in the pesticide data used for this study (developed by Nehring and Grube),
careful data adaptations were made through hedonic analysis to identify the impacts of
pesticide characteristics on their true or effective price, and thus their implicit quantity, as
motivated by Fernandex-Cornejo and Jans, and Beach and Carlson.  In particular, Beach
and Carlson show that productive characteristics tend to be positively associated with
pesticide price (application rates are inversely related to potency), while hazardous
characteristics are negatively related to pesticide price.  Accordingly, Nehring and Grube
accommodate pesticide application rates, toxicity (chemical composition), and
environmental variables reflecting persistence, mobility, and water quality levels in their
measures of the true economic or effective prices of the quality-adjusted pesticides
inputs, as elaborated in the Appendix.  The resulting adjusted shadow or virtual pesticide
prices of constant-quality chemicals, wP*, were then used to deflate the pesticide
expenditure data to reflect real effective pesticide quantities, P*.
11
                                                
10See, for example, Lichtenberg and Zilberman, and Chambers and Lichtenberg.
11 See Nehring and Grube for more details about these computations, and further discussion of the
patterns of the adjusted as compared to unadjusted data.12
These quality-adjusted or “effective” pesticide price and quantity measures thus
accommodate changing pesticide composition.
12  Such changes are reflected in “higher
quality” pesticides over time; wP* (P*) grows at a slower (faster) rate than wP (P), which
can be interpreted as a shift to relatively efficacious, less toxic, chemicals, through both
general technical change and responses to environmental concerns (induced innovation).
The magnitude of, and time- and space- variations in, the gap between wP* and wP (P*
and P) can thus be interpreted as the impacts of new technologies embodied in the
pesticide input.  And explicit recognition of this quality-gap allows us to distinguish
changes in the demand for physical pesticide quantities from those related to its quality or
effectiveness.
More formally, we can write the virtual pesticide price as wP* = ADJP·wP, where
the AJPP quality index adapts the price of P in terms of pounds to one embodying quality
characteristics according to the underlying hedonic model.
13 And since by definition wPP
= wP*P* = VALP (where VALP is the dollar expenditure on pesticides, and P* is
computed as VALP/wP*), wP*/wP =  P/P*, or P*=P/ADJ.  The multiplicative
14
specification of wP* (and thus P*) implies that the contribution of a percentage increase
in pesticide price (use) is the same whether it stems from quality (ADJP) or quantity (wP,
P) changes, but that we can distinguish these two components.
That is, the derivative ¶TC/¶wP* = SQP* yields the shadow quantity of the
effective pesticide input, which will equal P* (the P* demand function) if Shephard’s
lemma holds.  If instead we take the derivative with respect to the unadjusted price, using
                                                
12 Note that pesticide “effectiveness” is here defined according to hedonic analysis in terms of a
quality-constant price and implicit quality-adjusted quantity, rather than its effective application.
13 This is similar conceptually to adaptations of quasi-fixed inputs such as capital to accommodate
utilization as K*=uK or w*K=wK/u, along the lines of Jorgenson and Griliches.13
the equality wPP = wP*P*, we obtain ¶TC/¶wP = ADJP·¶TC/¶wP* = (wP*/wP)·P* =
(P/P*)·P* = P = SQP.  The difference between these values is obviously directly
dependent on the ADJP measure, but this quality gap between P* and P will differ
spatially and temporally, as well as potentially according to output composition patterns.
It is thus useful for understanding pesticide quantity and quality demand
variations to compare these measures by time period and regional breakdown.  Patterns
may also be distinguished by considering effective and physical pesticide demand
elasticities, such as eP*,t = ¶ln P*/¶t = ¶ln SQP*/¶t, representing time patterns of P* use, as
compared to eP,t = ¶ln P/¶t = ¶ln SQP/¶t for P.  Such elasticities may also be computed for
other arguments of the TC and thus SQP*, function; e.g., the deviation between eP*,C = ¶ln
P*/¶ln YC and eP,C = ¶ln P/¶ln YC indicates the effect of YC demand changes on P* versus
P.  However, since the difference between P* and P is simply multiplicative, one would
not expect substantive differences in the 2




The cost function from the model overviewed in the previous section takes the
general form TC = TC(YA,YC,BHL,BHR,wP*,wK,wL,wLD,wM,wF,t,DP,DF,DCT, DCN,Ds),
where the vector representation has been expanded to make explicit the individual
arguments of the function.
15  The vector of fixed effects includes two dummy variables
                                                                                                                                                
14 Or log-linear, as is typical for a hedonic equation: ln wP* = ln ADJP + ln wP.
15 The prices of the inputs other than P may also be thought of as effective or virtual prices,
accommodating in the data the stock/flow effects of fixities (for, say, K, LD), or other quality
characteristics (such as education for labor), although we will not make this explicit using *s
since this is not the focus of the current analysis..14
for structural shifts in pesticides and fertilizer use (DP, DF)
16 and two for the cotton and
corn states as groups (DCT, DCN).
 17  To incorporate state-specific intercepts in each
estimating equation, 48 state-level dummies (Ds) were used, with cross effects included
for each input price and output quantity.
Econometric implementation of the model and construction of parametric
derivative and elasticity measures requires first specifying a functional form for TC(·).
We approximate the cost relationship as a generalized Leontief form, where the output
levels and shift factors are included in quadratic form, as in Paul:
(1)  TC(Y,B,w,D,t) = dP1 wP*DP + dF1 wF DF+ SsSi dsj wj Ds + Sjwj (SsSm dsm Ym Ds)
+ SjSi (i¹j) aji wj
 .5 wi
.5 + Sj ajDP wj
 .5 wP*
.5 DP + Sj ajDF wj
 .5 wF
.5 DF
+ SjSm (j¹M) djm wj Ym + SmSr dmPDr Ym wp* Dr + SmSr dmFDr Ym wF Dr
+ SjSk djk wj Bk + Sk dkDP Bk wp* DP + Sk dkDF Bk wF DF
+ Sj djt wj t + Sr dtPDr t wp* Dr + Sr dtFDr t wF Dr
+ Sjwj (SmSn gmn Ym Yn + SmSk gmk Ym Bk
  + SkSl glk Bk Bl
+  gtt t
2 + Sm gmt Ym t
  + Sk gkt Bk t) ,
                                                
16 The DP dummy variable (with interaction terms for all wP* cross-effects) represents a 1984
break in the pesticide data found with the hedonic research to indicate roughly the year in which
most cropping sectors switched from or reduced use of many of the old line chemicals to the new.
The DF dummy variable (with interaction terms for all wF cross-effects) for the post-1979 time
period represents results from Chow tests that show this is an important point of structural change
in the fertilizer input, reflecting the energy crisis.  Note also that the corn and cotton dummy
interaction terms were not included for the bad outputs (Bk) due to their insignificance in
preliminary empirical investigation.
17 These fixed effects reflect differences in production structure with respect to chemicals use in
these areas, since the corn areas tend to use more old line chemicals with water quality but not
toxicity issues, and have lower pesticide prices, than do the cotton states.15
where i,j denote the input market or virtual prices of the inputs, m,n the good outputs, k,l
the bad outputs, and r the DP, DF, DCT and DCN fixed effects.
 18  The system of estimating
equations derived from this function comprises six factor demand equations, two output
pricing equations, and the cost function itself.  The factor demand estimating equations
are defined via Shephard’s lemma; P*=¶TC/¶wP*, F=¶TC/¶wF, K=¶TC/wK, L=¶TC/¶wL,
LD=¶TC/¶wLD, and M=¶TC/¶wM.  The output pricing equations are defined according to
pm=MCm equalities representing optimization over outputs (where pm is the market price
of Ym); pA = ¶TC/¶YA, and pC = ¶TC/¶YC).
19
 The resulting equation system was estimated using seemingly unrelated (SUR)
econometric procedures.  Instrumental variable (IV) techniques are instead often used in
the production literature when it is believed that potential errors in variables may be
present (for example, if quality-unadjusted pesticide data were used as a proxy for the
abatement input).  Use of the IV approach, however, may introduce further problems if
one does not specify the instruments appropriately (or if relevant instruments do not
exist), and is often not robust to alternative specifications.  IV can also cause problems
when used in conjunction with panel data, or in models in which an autoregressive
structure is explicitly incorporated, especially if the values of the lagged exogenous
variables are used as instruments (as is often done).  Due to these problems, and the care
                                                
18 The j¹M and i¹j requirements for the cross wj-Ym and cross-input-price terms is due to the
otherwise linear dependency from the wj summation before the fixed effects.
19 The behavioral implications of the output pricing specification might initially seem
questionable, since producers would be expected to output levels given observed output prices in
the presence of competitive markets.  However, as alluded to above, in preliminary investigation
other specifications based on just a cost model, a profit function, and an imperfectly competitive
market specification, generated implausible estimates.  An ex-post pricing mechanism clearly
dominates, possibly because prices in agricultural markets are determined by the amount of
output available after the growing period (for either a crop or animal product).16
taken in our data development, such that both the input demand and output pricing
equations appear empirically well characterized, SUR is preferable for this application.
Adaptations were made to the estimating model to accommodate potential
heteroskedasticity.  A standard way to accomplish this is to transform the input demand
equations into input/output measures, which reduces variations in scale across states and
time periods, but this did not affect the estimates substantively.  We thus, however,
simply used a procedure in PC-TSP that computes White’s heteroskedastic-consistent
covariance matrix, to generate appropriate standard errors.
Also, Durbin-Watson tests indicated that first-order autocorrelated errors were
present in the cost and input demand equations.  Therefore, an AR(1) term was directly
incorporated into the cost equation, and TC = TC(·) + r TC×et-1 + et was estimated (where
rTC is the cost function-specific AR(1) parameter, and et is the period t estimation error
for TC(·)).  Analogous adaptations were made to the input demand equations based on
the general form Y = bX + rY×et-1 + et.
20  This approach led to a complex non-linear
estimating system, but the resulting estimates of the r’s were very significant, and
standard statistical tests indicated that the adjustment accounted for autocorrelation.
The parameter estimates for this model are presented in the Appendix (with the
coefficients on the state dummies omitted to keep the table manageable).  Although in a
model this multifaceted the individual parameter estimates have limited interpretation,
the overall statistical significance of the parameters is notable (even most of the states
dummies were significant).  Also, the R
2s indicate excellent “fits” for the estimated
equations, with all of them reaching at least 0.92.
                                                
20 Because of this specification, the first observation for each state was dropped for estimation.17
The Overall Estimates: Risk Shadow Values, Pesticide Demand, and Netput Interactions
Bad output and pesticide cost and benefit indicators computed from the estimated
parameters for the full data sample are presented in Table 1.  The reported estimates are
(non-weighted) averages across all states and time periods.  The t-statistics are based on
evaluation of the measures at the mean values of the data, using the ANALYZ command
in PC-TSP to implement a generalized Wald test.
21
The primary measures indicating the marginal benefits of using the environment
for leaching and runoff are the shadow values SVBk=¶TC/¶Bk for BHL and BHR.  These
measures are both negative (indicating that allowing higher risk factors is cost-saving for
the producer) and statistically significant at approximately the 5% level on average for
the whole sample (the SVHR and SVHL p-values are 0.051 and 0.034).
22
Overall patterns in bad output shadow values associated with time and structural
trends may also be assessed from the estimates in Table 1.  The positive eSVHL,t =
¶ln SVHL/¶t elasticity, for example, shows that SVHL is increasing (in absolute value, so
the costs of reducing BHL are greater) over time, whereas the reverse seems true for
SVHR.
23  In the post-1979 and post-1984 periods (represented by DF and DP), SVHL seems
to have risen slightly and then fallen from trend (in absolute value), although SVHR seems
to have been consistently ratcheting upward.  None of these relationships are, however,
statistically significant.
                                                
21 The procedure computes the constraints for the hypothesis that the measure equals zero, and the
associated covariance matrix, evaluated at the estimated parameter vector for a given data point.
22 When leaching and runoff risk factors for fish stocks were also included, their shadow values
were almost invariably statistically insignificant, although when they were incorporated without
the associated human risk factors their estimates were similar to those for the BHL and BHR
measures.  This suggests that their costs are not separately identifiable for these data.
23 Note that a negative value for the eSV,r elasticity implies a positive measure of ¶SVBk/¶r, since
the derivative is multiplied by the (negative) SVBk value to construct the elasticity.18
In terms of input-specific patterns, risk reduction is clearly pesticide-using in the
absolute sense that lowering risk requires increasing effective pesticide use; eP*,HL =
¶ln P*/¶ln BHL and eP*,HR = ¶ln P*/¶ln BHR are negative and significant, both statistically
and in terms of magnitude (especially for runoff).  This implies that technology or
innovations embodied in P* increase substantively to attenuate risk.  By contrast, the only
input insignificantly related to both risk factors is the other chemical input, fertilizer.
The analogous negative eK,HL and eK,HR measures suggest that capital has a
tendency to “substitute” for the environment, in the sense that additional capital is
required to reduce human risk factors, although eK,HL is insignificant.  The M elasticities
with respect to BHL and BHR are also negative and both relatively large and significant.
Land instead seems in some sense “complementary” with risk; risk reduction implies
lower land use.  The indications for labor are mixed, although generally toward
substitutability, as for capital.
The input composition effects associated with marginal changes in risk are clearly
biased, as indicated by comparison of these input/risk elasticities to each other and to the
overall cost elasticities eTC,HL = -0.009 and eTC,HR = -0.008 (where eTC,Bk = ¶ln TC/¶ln Bk
= SVBk·Bk/TC).   For a BHL decrease, for example, P* is affected the most (reducing
human risk from leaching is greatly P*-using), L and M demands rise relative to other
inputs, capital changes less than overall input use (a relative capital-saving bias), and land
use decreases (an absolute land-saving bias).  So input composition adapts substantially
to accommodate risk reduction.
For the outputs, the eMCm ,Bk = ¶  ln M  Cm /¶  ln Bk elasticities are small and generally
positive.  In particular, the positive (but small and not quite significant at the 5% level)19
eMCA,HL and eMCA,HR elasticities suggests that human risk reduction is consistent with
lower marginal costs of animal production, thus implying some motivation toward
producing YA rather than YC.  This is intuitively plausible, since one might expect YA to
have little connection to leaching and runoff from chemical use.
24  By contrast, the
negative and significant eMCC,HR estimate indicates jointness between crop production and
risk from runoff, or higher marginal costs of crops associated with lower risk levels.
In turn, implications about pesticide demand, and its quality as compared to
quantity components (P* versus P) are evident from the overall SQP*, SQP, and ADJP
measures in Table 1.  The fitted shadow value of P* is on average nearly 1.5 times as
large as the unadjusted P level
 , implying an average measured quality adaptation factor
of approximately 0.70. The average ADJP is instead approximately 0.88.  So quality-
adjusted pesticide use P* exceeds P by more than the average adjustment factor.
25  This
suggests that a large portion of the measured variation in P* involves quality rather than
quantity differentials, in turn supporting the notion that the increases in P* required to
decrease risk are driven primarily by quality change, or embodied innovation.
The impacts of (temporal and spatial) shift factors and output composition on P*
as compared to P demand can also be evaluated using the indicators presented in Table 1.
Note that all measured elasticities of P* demand with respect to these factors are
statistically significant and positive, except that relating to fertilizer structural change,
(eP*,DF = ¶ln P*/¶DF), which might be expected.  In particular, measured effective
                                                
24 Of course risk from animal waste is also a major issue, particularly in some states.  Although
we do not currently have measures of such factors, work is proceeding to generate such measures
that will be used in later research to establish these relationships.
25 The difference between P* and P implicitly weights the ADJP measures, since we are
computing the average of the multiplicative relationship SQP* = fitted P*= fitted P/ADJP = SQP,
rather than averaging P*, P and ADJP separately and then multiplying them.20
pesticide use increased significantly over time (eP*,t = ¶ln P*/¶t >0), and especially after
1984 (eP*,DP = ¶ln P*/¶DP>0).  However, these positive relationship are much smaller in
magnitude for P than for P*,
26 again suggesting that structural adaptations in the pesticide
input have primarily worked to increase the quality component of P*.
P* demand is also strong, in terms of levels, in both the corn and cotton states
relative to others (eP*,DCN and eP*,DCT are positive), although in this case this differential is
even more marked for P then P* (eP*,DCN and eP*,DCT fall short of eP,DCN and eP,DCT)  And
the impacts of greater crop products in the output mix are quite dramatic – a 1 percent
augmentation of crop output implies a dramatic 2.7 percent rise in P* (eP*,C
= ¶ln P*/¶ln YC » 2.7, with eP,C » 1.5), so scale increases with respect to the crop output
are biased toward pesticide use.  By contrast, higher levels of animal outputs generate a
much smaller (less than 0.3 percent) but still positive proportional change in quality-
adjusted pesticide inputs (although a more than 0.45 percent change in P), possibly
associated with greater crop production for animal feed.
Temporal and Spatial Patterns
It is also informative to explore more explicitly the temporal and spatial patterns
of the shadow value and pesticide use/quality measures by comparing some primary
elasticity estimates across time periods and regions.  For the temporal dimension, we
separate the measures by the decades covered in the data – the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and
1990s, and for the spatial dimension we distinguish 10 regions (for the 48 contiguous
states), according to the USDA breakdown for regional productivity, as in Table 2.
                                                
26 The significance level is the same, given the multiplicative relationship.21
Table 2
CN Corn States IL, IN, IA, MI, MN, MO,
NB, OH, WI, SD
CT Cotton States AL, AZ, AR, CA, GA, LA,
MS, NC, TN, TX
Region 1 Northeast CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT,
DE, MD, NJ, NY, PA
Region 2 Corn Belt IL, IN, IA, MO, OH
Region 3 Lake States MI, MN, WI
Region 4 Northern Plains KS, NE, ND, SD
Region 5 Appalachian KY, NC, TN, VA, WV
Region 6 Southeast AL, Fl, GA, SC
Region 7 Delta AR, LA, MS
Region 8 Southern Plains OK, TX
Region 9 Mountain AZ, CO, ID, MT, NV, NM,
VT, WY
Region 10 Pacific CA, OR, WA
The eTC,HL and eTC,HR values by decade, presented in Table 3, indicate an upward
trend in the proportional agricultural sector marginal-cost-benefits of BHL disposal.  But
the reverse occurs for BHR, which is consistent with the more general eSVk,t estimates,
from Table 1.
27  The implications for the associated pesticide costs follow closely;
                                                
27 It is important to present these in proportional (real) terms, eTC,Bk = ¶ln TC/¶ln Bk to see these
trends, since the nominal trends reflected in the SVBk = ¶TC/¶Bk values can be somewhat
misleading for comparisons. The tendency for the BHL value to increase is exacerbated if one
looks instead at the SVBk values, and that for BHR appears slightly upward rather than downward
as it is when looking at percentage changes.22
pesticide-quality-enhancing costs of reducing BHL (represented by eP*,HL=¶ln P*/¶ln BHL)
are increasing over time, but are declining for BHR (from eP*,HR).
For the regional breakdown, note first that the Corn Belt states have a far smaller
marginal cost (shadow value) of risk reduction in percentage terms, at least for leaching
(eTC,HL=-0.0007), than is found in other areas.  Leaching-risk reductions in the corn states
also seem associated with lower effective pesticide use; eP*,HL is positive, and larger than
for any other region (although Northern Plains and Pacific states exhibit similar
tendencies).  The highest proportional costs of reducing leaching, BHL, appear instead in
the Southeast and the Appalachian regions.  The implied change in P* follows closely,
with the Appalachian and Southeast states requiring the most augmentation of P* to
reduce leaching risk, and the Northeast closely following.
By contrast, the costs of reducing runoff are significantly larger in the Corn Belt
states, where decreases in runoff are strongly linked to increased effective pesticide
application.  The states with the next highest costs of reducing runoff are in the Lake,
Southeast, and Delta areas, which also exhibit some of the greatest corresponding
increases in P*.  However, the impact of BHR on effective P use, eP*,HR, is even larger in
the Northern Plans and Appalachian regions; the magnitude of eP*,HR in these areas is
next to the Corn Belt in terms of magnitude, although the implied P* adjustment to
reduce runoff risk is less than one-third that for the Corn Belt states.
These patterns embody both quality and quantity components, as exhibited by
regional variations in the levels and composition of applied pesticides.  They are likely,
for example, linked to the more dramatic increases in herbicide use found in the Corn and
Southern states than in other regions.  This hypothesis seems consistent with the Beach23
and Carlson finding of a positive relationship of herbicide prices for corn (and soybeans)
to productive characteristics of pesticides.  By contrast, the Pacific region exhibits
virtually no change in effective pesticide use in order to lower runoff, which may reflect
the large quantities of non-persistent petroleum oils and sulfur used in California.
To facilitate evaluating the quality and quantity components of the pesticide input
relationships, elasticities reflecting the temporal and spatial patterns of SQP* (P*) and
SQP (P) demand are reported in Table 4.  First note the dramatic difference in the time
trends of – and thus the gap between – P* as compared to P.  From the 1960s to the 1990s
the fitted value of P*, SQP*, increased by a factor of 5, whereas the average SQP doubled
by the 1980s and then dropped again.  This corresponds to a drop of ADJP from 1.3 to
0.26 during this time period, clearly indicating that increases in the shadow quantity of P*
have primarily been driven by quality changes.  This seems broadly consistent with the
finding of Fernandez-Cornejo and Jans that constant quality pesticide use peaked in 1981,
and yet expenditures, and thus implicitly quality, continued to increase significantly.
In terms of regions, the largest quality gap appears in the Southern Plains,
followed by the Mountain States (that also exhibit very low pesticide use overall), and the
Delta region.   In terms of levels, the Corn Belt states show the highest P* demand, with
the Pacific region, which has many pesticide-intensive crops, the second in line.
However, in the Corn Belt the ADJP measure on average actually suggests a low level of
pesticide quality (along with the Lake and Southeast states, with the Northern Plains
next), whereas the Pacific states are above average in terms of quality levels.  Note also
that although some of these regions exhibit ADJP levels that exceed one, the (implicitly24
weighted) SQP/SQP* ratios all fall short of one, and of the associated ADJP averages, thus
supporting again the predominance of quality- to quantity-attributes driving demand.
Overall, costs of risk attenuation, and pesticide use/quality patterns, have differed
dramatically in both temporal and spatial dimensions.  This has important implications
about where risk reductions are likely to be the most prevalent without direct regulation.
It also indicates how and where agricultural producers are likely to be the hardest-hit in
terms of costs, if regulations requiring reductions in risk from leaching and runoff were to
be implemented.
Concluding Remarks
This study uses a detailed model of the production structure in U.S. agriculture,
and comprehensive data on outputs and inputs – including effective (quality-adjusted)
pesticide quantities, and risk from leaching and runoff – to address issues of pesticide use
and its benefits and costs to agricultural producers.  In particular, we focus on measuring
the potential costs to producers of reducing human risk from leaching and runoff
associated with pesticide use.  We find that changes in production plans to accommodate
risk reductions result in significant costs (shadow values), that in turn involve clear
output and input composition adaptations.
In particular, these costs are directly associated with substantive increases in
effective pesticide quantities (as opposed to simple poundage), which implies induced
innovation to augment pesticide quality.  This quality is embodied in the pesticides via
R&D and associated technological change, and has risen considerably over the sample
period, and especially since the mid-1980s.  More generally, in terms of netput
composition changes, lowering risk from pesticide use involves more materials and less25
land use, greater capital and labor intensity (perhaps though additional monitoring, or
more careful application), and a potential shift from crop to animal commodity
production.  The costs incurred by agricultural producers to make such adjustments (in
addition to the augmentation of pesticide quality) have increased over time, vary widely
by region, and differ for reductions in risk from leaching as compared to runoff.26
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 Appendix
Total pesticide use in terms of pounds of active ingredients in U.S. agriculture
increased by more than 3 percent per year from 1960 through the late 1970s/early 1980s,
and then stabilized, while expenditures continued to increase.
28  The mix of
characteristics, such as application rate, leachability, and toxicity, also changed
significantly during this period, as agricultural producers changed their production
processes, including a major move toward herbicide as compared to insecticide use.
To adapt the base measures of pesticide prices and quantities for these quality
changes, Nehring and Grube regressed the prices of a broad range of pesticides on
physical characteristics related to their actual or perceived quality.  The productive and
environmental characteristics incorporated in the analysis include pesticide applications
rates as a proxy for pesticide potency,
29 LD50 scores as a proxy for toxicity,
30 and
persistence dummies based on solubility, vapor, sorption, and half lives.
31  Time
dummies also imbedded in the regressions were converted to hedonic price indexes, or
virtual price indexes for pesticides that capture price effects not connected with quality.
The effective or quality-adjusted quantity indexes, P*, were then computed implicitly by
dividing total expenditures on each pesticide by their adjusted price index, wP*.
Although consistent with Fernandez-Cornejo and Jans, and Beach and Carlson, this
treatment involves a much more detailed representation of the quality characteristics, and
                                                
28 The growth in quantity and costs of the pesticide inputs used, that far exceeded that for any
other input, reflected a shift from labor-intensive production methods to more capital- and
chemical-intensive methods due to changes in technology, production processes, prices, and
regulatory policies.
29 A low rate is assumed to be consistent with a more effective pesticide.
30 LD50 scores indicate the amount of toxicant necessary to effect a 50% kill of the pest being
tested.  Dummy variable divide pesticides into those with high (>500) or low toxicity scores.28
their differential spatial and temporal patterns, of the pesticides.  In particular, the earlier
studies relied on limited survey information, number of crops and chemicals, and
information on variability.  The Nehring and Grube study instead catalogued pesticides
by chemical, crop, year, and location (from Doane and NASS surveys), incorporating
information on close to twenty crops and 200 chemicals.  Thus, this pesticide data
provides a particularly appropriate basis for our state-level analysis.
32
                                                                                                                                                
31 Dummy variables represent half lives of more than 65 days (following Fernandez-Cornejo and
Jans), and above-mean values of solubility, vapor, and sorption.
32 Empirical implementation of our model using these data also suggested that the Nehring-Grube
adaptations of the data were carried out in a manner consistent with economic theory.  Our use of
Shephard’s lemma based on the wP* measure is supported by both appropriate (in terms of
regularity conditions) and intuitively plausible estimates of demand behavior.  And when
optimization equations were not imposed for the P input, so its true shadow value (or quantity)
could be indirectly imputed, the resulting production structure pattern estimates remained
substantively unchanged.Table 1:  Shadow Value and Elasticity Measures, overall averages
measureestimate t-statistic measureestimate t-statistic measureestimate t-statistic
eP*,HL -0.0243 -1.887 SQP* 0.0884 1.955
SVHL -0.0164 -2.118 eP*,HR -0.0644 -2.472 SQP 0.0620 3.816
SVHR -0.0004 -1.951 ADJP 0.8820
eTC,HL -0.0090 -2.118 eF,HL 0.0035 0.175
eTC,HR -0.0077 -1.951 eF,HR -0.0151 -1.273 eP*,t 1.2795 5.162
eLD,HL 0.0086 2.157 eP*,DF -0.2121 -0.981
eSVHL,t 0.0175 1.058 eLD,HR 0.0107 2.348 eP*,DP 2.4116 -3.881
eSVHR,t -0.0104 -0.556 eL,HL -0.0205 -1.867 eP*,DCT 0.8004 7.724
eSVHL,DF 0.0155 0.926 eL,HR 0.0144 1.961 eP*,DCN 0.8274 8.269
eSVHL,DP -0.0030 -0.640 eK,HL -0.0017 -1.063 eP*,A 0.2769 2.441
eSVHR,DF 0.0132 0.406 eK,HR -0.0074 -2.563 eP*,C 2.7145 23.472
eSVHR,DP 0.0145 1.196 eM,HL -0.0141 -1.850
eM,HR -0.0255 -2.875 eP,t 0.3750 5.162
eP,DF -0.0650 -0.981
eMCA,HL 0.0039 1.731 eP,DP 0.6482 -3.881
eMCA,HR 0.0053 1.884 eP,DCT 1.0128 7.724
eMCC,HL 0.0055 1.295 eP,DCN 0.9902 8.269
eMCC,HR -0.0001 -1.943 eP,A 0.4591 2.441
eP,C 1.5444 23.472Table 3:  Bad Output Measures, temporal and spatial
overall average 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s
eTC,HL -0.0090 eTC,HL -0.0033 eTC,HL -0.0099 eTC,HL -0.0092 eTC,HL -0.0148
eTC,HR -0.0077 eTC,HR -0.0131 eTC,HR -0.0084 eTC,HR -0.0047 eTC,HR -0.0039
eP*,HL -0.0243 eP*,HL -0.0073 eP*,HL -0.0294 eP*,HL -0.0299 eP*,HL -0.0312
eP*,HR -0.0644 eP*,HR -0.1708 eP*,HR -0.0434 eP*,HR -0.0222 eP*,HR -0.0180
Northeast Corn Belt Lake States Northern Plains Appalachian
eTC,HL -0.0088 eTC,HL -0.0007 eTC,HL -0.0077 eTC,HL -0.0031 eTC,HL -0.0177
eTC,HR -0.0031 eTC,HR -0.0264 eTC,HR -0.0134 eTC,HR -0.0068 eTC,HR -0.0080
eP*,HL -0.0534 eP*,HL 0.0406 eP*,HL -0.0035 eP*,HL 0.0130 eP*,HL -0.0691
eP*,HR -0.0200 eP*,HR -0.3059 eP*,HR -0.0817 eP*,HR -0.1004 eP*,HR -0.0595
Southeast Delta Southern Plains Mountain Pacific
eTC,HL -0.0399 eTC,HL -0.0079 eTC,HL -0.0020 eTC,HL -0.0022 eTC,HL -0.0015
eTC,HR -0.0116 eTC,HR -0.0111 eTC,HR -0.0031 eTC,HR -0.0009 eTC,HR -0.0004
eP*,HL -0.0827 eP*,HL -0.0153 eP*,HL -0.0001 eP*,HL -0.0173 eP*,HL 0.0119
eP*,HR -0.0461 eP*,HR -0.0334 eP*,HR -0.0204 eP*,HR -0.0085 eP*,HR -0.0020Table 4:  P*, P and ADJP measures, temporal and spatial
overall average 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s
SQP* 0.0884 SQP* 0.0333 SQP* 0.0737 SQP* 0.1162 SQP* 0.1407
SQP 0.0620 SQP 0.0418 SQP 0.0825 SQP 0.0817 SQP 0.0303
ADJP 0.8820 ADJP 1.3110 ADJP 1.1294 ADJP 0.6833 ADJP 0.2625
Northeast Corn Belt Lake States Northern Plains Appalachian
SQP* 0.0227 SQP* 0.2043 SQP* 0.1361 SQP* 0.1088 SQP* 0.0490
SQP 0.0168 SQP 0.1614 SQP 0.0977 SQP 0.0731 SQP 0.0388
ADJP 0.8786 ADJP 1.0825 ADJP 1.0917 ADJP 1.0284 ADJP 0.9182
Southeast Delta Southern Plains Mountain Pacific
SQP* 0.0923 SQP* 0.1356 SQP* 0.1641 SQP* 0.0334 SQP* 0.1717
SQP 0.0793 SQP 0.0790 SQP 0.0741 SQP 0.0180 SQP 0.1190
ADJP 1.0717 ADJP 0.7611 ADJP 0.5429 ADJP 0.6493 ADJP 0.8190Appendix Table A1:  Coefficient Estimates 
Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic
dF1 -0.139 -5.74 aPFCN 0.036 3.55 dHLDP 0.0005 0.77
dP1 -0.190 -6.32 aFDP -0.002 -0.83 dLDHR 0.00004 1.68
aLDL -0.013 -2.09 dLDA -0.971 -76.43 dLHR 0.0001 3.08
aLDK 0.082 8.12 dLA -0.921 -54.45 dKHR -0.0001 -5.42
aLDF -0.004 -0.91 dKA -0.900 -66.55 dFHR -0.0001 -2.88
aLDDF 0.012 3.61 dFA -0.905 -58.76 dHRDF -0.00001 -0.89
aLDFCT -0.025 -3.48 dADF 0.015 4.90 dMHR -0.0006 -8.24
aLDFCN -0.007 -0.97 dPA -0.931 -65.03 dPHR -0.0001 -3.61
aLDM -0.034 -3.74 dADP -0.001 -0.56 dHLDP -0.00003 -2.18
aLDP 0.006 1.19 dAPCT 0.026 2.43 gAA -0.0003 -0.43
aLDDP -0.012 -3.21 dAPCN -0.014 -1.29 gCC -0.0011 -3.13
aLDPCT 0.001 0.09 dAFCT -0.013 -1.07 gHLHL 0.00003 1.86
aLDPCN 0.013 1.50 dAFCN -0.029 -2.44 gHRHR 0.00000001 1.41
aLK 0.012 1.65 dLDC -0.623 -87.22 gAt -0.0018 -26.53
aLF -0.022 -1.93 dLC -0.584 -55.48 gCt -0.0018 -28.78
aLDF 0.013 1.30 dKC -0.576 -88.39 gHLt -0.0001 -1.54
aLFCT 0.026 1.47 dFC -0.571 -69.82 gHRt 0.000001 1.27
aLFCN 0.075 4.46 dCDF 0.004 2.00 gAHL 0.0003 2.20
aLM 0.234 8.70 dPC -0.613 -84.63 gCHL 0.0005 3.62
aLP 0.016 2.30 dCDP -0.001 -0.49 gHLHR 0.000005 2.20
aLDP -0.001 -0.15 dCPCT 0.021 4.48 gAHR 0.00001 2.43
aLPCT 0.014 1.21 dCPCN 0.009 2.43 gCHR -0.00001 -2.85
aLPCN -0.0004 -0.04 dCFCT -0.011 -1.81 gAC -0.0016 -2.60
aKF 0.019 3.40 dCFCN -0.006 -1.23 r 0.835 85.77
aKDF 0.034 10.25 dLDt 0.004 5.67 rL 0.607 54.85
aKFCT 0.024 2.08 dLt -0.009 -10.71 rF 0.786 59.89
aKFCN 0.016 1.30 dKt -0.013 -9.63 rM 0.883 114.40
aKM -0.066 -5.01 dFt -0.003 -4.17 rP 0.967 294.84
aKP 0.031 3.90 dtDF 0.005 4.62 rLD 0.896 108.39
aKDP 0.018 4.09 dMt -0.023 -8.54 rK 0.954 284.05
aKPCT 0.028 1.68 dPt 0.003 2.29
aKPCN -0.004 -0.20 dtDP 0.005 4.22 Equation:R-squared
aFM 0.047 4.07 dtPCT 0.010 4.84
aMDF 0.0004 0.03 dtPCN 0.022 10.52 TC 0.989
aMFCT 0.161 6.27 dtFCT 0.004 4.75 L 0.974
aMFCN 0.169 6.16 dtFCN 0.007 8.89 F 0.932
aMP -0.019 -2.16 dLDHL 0.002 1.18 M 0.970
aMDP 0.043 4.15 dLHL -0.009 -3.52 P* 0.966
aMPCT 0.088 4.46 dKHL -0.002 -1.14 LD 0.999
aMPCN 0.042 1.87 dFHL 0.0001 0.06 K* 0.996
aFP 0.008 2.25 dHLDF -0.001 -1.60 MCA 0.942
aPDF 0.013 3.38 dMHL -0.012 -2.56 MCC 0.920
aPFCT 0.007 0.79 dPHL -0.002 -1.85